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Abstract. As the outbreak of Ebola virus disease (EVD) in West Africa continues, clinical preparedness is needed
in countries at risk for EVD (e.g., United States) and more fully equipped and supported clinical teams in those countries
with epidemic spread of EVD in Africa. Clinical staff must approach the patient with a very deliberate focus on providing
effective care while assuring personal safety. To do this, both individual health care providers and health systems must
improve EVD care. Although formal guidance toward these goals exists from the World Health Organization, Medecin
Sans Frontie`res, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and other groups, some of the most critical lessons
come from personal experience. In this narrative, clinicians deployed by the World Health Organization into a wide range
of clinical settings in West Africa distill key, practical considerations for working safely and effectively with patients
with EVD.
An unprecedented number of health care professionals from
a variety of clinical settings, in a wide range of countries are
thinking about, preparing for and caring for Ebola virus disease
(EVD) patients. Guidance documents on infection prevention
and control (IPC) practice and clinical care have been pro-
duced by organizations with EVD experience.1–3 The World
Health Organization (WHO) produces guidance for implemen-
tation across a wide range of resource settings. Medecin Sans
Frontie`res produces guidance for medical team activities across
the outbreak. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) focus on measures which can be taken by the United
States health system and extrapolated by others involved in
preparedness and response. There are no short cuts to clinical
preparedness for EVD. These documents and their revisions
should be reviewed carefully.
As important as guidance documents are, many lessons must
be learned from specific hands-on experience. The WHO has
mobilized clinical consultants in support of EVD response in
each of the affected countries in West Africa. This short list of
key points attempts to consolidate practical lessons learned that
do not always percolate into technical documents. Having
landed in unconstrained, resource-limited settings at the start
of local EVD clinical operations in an outbreak, and more
established EVD care centers, we hope that others might adopt
some of these lessons and avoid some of the risks inherent to the
steep learning curve associated with delivering EVD care. The
points are geared toward the daily care of patients as opposed to
the critical mechanics of establishing a care center and develop-
ing its procedures. They are focused on the outbreak setting and
also have relevance to the referral hospital setting.
BE GUIDED BY THE SCIENCE
EVD patient care must be deliberate and vigilant. Anxiety
around EVD reflected in media reports or shown by commu-
nities directly, and rapidly evolving events on the ground,
sometimes blur facts. The science behind basic aspects of how
clinicians can safely approach the patient in these settings
should be respected. It is based on decades of laboratory
research and field observation. Although much remains to be
discovered, Ebola virus is spread only during the symptomatic
phase of illness, especially in the setting of diarrhea, vomiting,
or bleeding. Although the longest incubation period is 3 weeks,
most cases present in < 2 weeks.4 Safe and effective care is
possible and has been achieved repeatedly, in resource fortu-
nate and resource poor settings. To do so, steps must be taken
to ensure appropriate training and safe working conditions.5
These steps must be shaped by science and experience and not
undermined by anxiety. Ebola virus, like all micro-organisms,
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possesses and follows defined physical and biological princi-
ples. Understanding these principles helps to eliminate a sense
of mystery, reduces stress, and keeps responders’ focus on
the work (Figure 1).
THINK AGGRESSIVELY; ACT SAFELY
Safe and effective care for EVD patients has been achieved
in both resource-poor and well-resourced settings. A targeted
strategy of aggressive volume repletion and electrolyte man-
agement, vigilance for patient safety in the isolation environ-
ment, attention to hypoperfusion-related complications and co-
infection (particularly malaria among those from endemic
areas), and general supportive management for hospitalized
patients improves survival.5 Both oral rehydration solution
(ORS) and parenteral fluid and electrolyte resuscitation can
be given aggressively and safely while following standard, con-
tact and droplet infection prevention and control precautions.
Peripheral and central venous access, dialysis, and mechanical
ventilation have been performed safely in the right settings.
All procedures in the high-risk area, just as in patient care
everywhere, must follow a careful risk-benefit assessment.
“First do no harm” applies to the patient, the staff, and the
community. Taking a few minutes before conducting any inter-
vention to ensure the procedure will benefit the patient, and is
adequately prepared with the necessary materials, support, and
environment, may dramatically enhance staff safety. Team
approaches enhance the preparation and execution of proce-
dures. Procedures should be appropriate to the mix of need
and resources at hand. They should be practiced. For each
procedure, refine movements so that they are deliberate and
carefully consider the placement of supporting staff.
ENSURE THAT THE WORKING ENVIRONMENT IS
SAFE FOR BOTH YOU AND YOUR PATIENTS
EVD care must occur in a work environment that draws
on non-clinician expertise. Clinicians typically do not manage
environmental aspects of health facilities. In EVD care, they
have a critical stake in it. For instance, the health unit where
EVD patients will be treated requires a thoughtful layout
taking into consideration staff and patient flow through low-
and high-risk areas, sufficient numbers of staff (clinician and
non-clinician), and robust water and sanitation, hygiene, and
waste management support.
BE CONFIDENT BUT CAREFUL IN THE USE
OF PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT
Personal protective equipment (PPE) protection requires
careful and comprehensive training, repeated practice, and com-
petency assessment. This must be in the context of on-site IPC
and clinical procedures that are safe, sensible, functional, and
reproducible. Training and practice must occur before and dur-
ing work with suspect or confirmed EVD patients. Mentoring
by more experienced clinicians is critical. Systems should
include a designated controller of the doffing and decontamina-
tion area, and constant co-supervision of each other using a
buddy system to reduce errors and the risk of infections.
ANYONE CAN AND SHOULD CALL A SAFETY STOP
Everyone associated with running an EVD care center, in
and out of high-risk areas, is responsible for contributing to
safe and effective patient care. Regardless of job, rank, and
culture, anyone can and should flag concerns for staff and
patient safety. Sometimes having a single, universal word that
anyone can say to freeze activity is helpful. Usually we use the
word “stop.” It is not commonly used for other reasons. When
a concern is present, “stop” reminds people to cease all move-
ment and activity until the concern is voiced and addressed
through a risk-benefit assessment. This approach also prevents
multiple people trying to provide instructions at once—a
common occurrence, which can increase a person’s risk in
doffing areas where multiple people are observing the removal
of PPE.
PROTECT AND CALL “STOP” ON YOURSELF
Proper IPC practice requires practice, patience, monitor-
ing, assessment, and intervention. Donning and doffing of
PPE, safe sharps use and disposal and patient movement pro-
cedures must be carefully rehearsed and not rushed. Almost
inevitably, despite the best of preparations, a process occa-
sionally will go wrong when in an isolation area. Visors,
glasses, or goggles fog, face masks become saturated and col-
lapse toward the nose or mouth, suits and gloves tear, light
fades, power outages occur, a patient becomes agitated,
fatigue or heat stress intrudes. When this happens to us, we
stop, stand upright, place hands in a neutral position folded in
front and take a few breaths. We then decide whether there
really is a problem. If there is, we decide whether it inhibits
completing the task at hand, whether we should finish that
task or redesign it, or immediately exit the high risk area and
safely doff PPE. Regularly ask yourself “is it safe for me to do
this now?” When in doubt, exit expeditiously with your buddy
system partner. Take fluids—many of us have been slow to
take fluids aggressively enough—reassess the situation and
either decide to get dressed again for short re-entry to com-
plete a task or turn it over to someone else.
The PPE and its use is only part of good IPC practice. The
PPE brings specific challenges. The removal of contaminated
Figure 1. One of the authors delivers a suspect EVD case patient’s
diagnostic blood sample to a local healthcare colleague waiting in the
low-risk area.
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PPE presents risk and requires a structured process and atten-
tion to detail including real-time guidance and monitoring.
The process of doffing will take many minutes and must not
be rushed. This must be factored into both planning and the
exit decision.
Complications with PPE are not the only set of challenges
that may require a clinician to take stock of the situation
acutely. An agitated patient may interrupt a needle proce-
dure. A pause can allow some tasks to be redesigned such as
changing to alternate routes of medication administration.
Sometimes, critical interventions such as peripheral intrave-
nous (IV) placement must be deferred until a subsequent
entry into the high-risk area.
Patients and staff are far better served with more frequent
entries into the high-risk area over time than single long entries
that increase fatigue and the possibility of risky behavior. Time
scheduled in PPE may need adjustment to fit the individual,
climatic conditions, and the tasks. Remember to alert team-
mates when exiting. There is no shame in an unexpected exit.
TIME IN PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT
SHOULD BE TIME WITH THE PATIENT
Patients require bedside clinician care. The most important
aspect of clinical care is close interaction between the
healthcare provider and the patient. In the field, this can be
compromised by marked resource-need mismatches. Further-
more, even the most acclimatized professional with the best
working conditions gets fatigued and potentially distracted in
PPE while observing comprehensive IPC practice. Solid prepa-
ration and planning of activities in the high-risk area preserves
time with the patient, increases general efficiency, and increases
safety. For example, procedures requiring the use of sharps such
as adding electrolytes to crystalloid solutions can be done
before entering the high-risk area, preserving time with the
patient and limiting use of sharps in a high-risk environment.
TREAT THE PATIENT, NOT THE IDEA
OF THE PATIENT
Clinicians carry many preconceived notions about what a
viral hemorrhagic fever patient looks like. In fact, hemorrhage
is not a prominent sign or symptom in most patients presenting
with EVD. Respect the clinical syndrome observed in the indi-
vidual patient. Like any severely ill patient, an EVD patient
requires objective and longitudinal evaluation and interven-
tion. These patients can have waxing and waning clinical
courses or precipitous deteriorations. All of us have been hum-
bled by how quickly some EVD patients progress from being
moderately stable to severely ill. Young patients can appear
compensated longer before rapid declines. In part, this may be
a result of barriers in achieving an optimal clinical examination
in PPE and a lack of clinical laboratory testing in field settings.
Nonetheless, patients in referral intensive care unit (ICU)
settings with severe multiple organ dysfunction and requiring
ventilator and dialysis support have recovered.
Although the dominant clinical challenge in most EVD
patients is volume and electrolyte resuscitation, common non-
infectious co-morbidities such as diabetes, hypertension, and
heart disease may complicate disease course, particularly in
older patients. In addition to malaria, other endemic health
risks are present in West Africa including helminthic infec-
tions, amoebiasis, acute thiamine deficiency, and sickle cell
disease. Patients and families remain the best sources of infor-
mation. Many barriers exist to obtaining it. They include chal-
lenges of communicating through PPE, short amounts of time
with individual patients, and language and cultural barriers.
Like all care settings, each patient is unique. Among cases
presenting for care, the signs, symptoms and in the field even
the history of an EVD patient may be non-specific. Suspect
case definitions are necessarily sensitive. Good individual and
collateral history taking, and the use of systematic testing and
empiric treatment protocols addressing common health risks
and care challenges are important.
Symptom-control strategies should be adopted early and
throughout illness—myalgias, arthralgias, sore throat, abdomi-
nal and atypical chest pain, nausea and vomiting, and anxiety
are common features that can be addressed in the care of
moderately and severely ill EVD patients.
ENGAGE PATIENTS FOR HELP
WHEN APPROPRIATE
Even the best staffed EVD care centers may be challenged
in delivering continual care to patients. Tasking patients to
drink specific quantities of ORS and reviewing their perfor-
mance frequently builds rapport, empowers patients, and
improves intake volume. When resources become stretched,
and sometimes in the best of circumstances, recovering patients
may be invaluable as informal aides in the care of others. The
EVD care center becomes a microcosm for community organi-
zation. Other patients often contribute to the care of pregnant
women, young children, and the elderly—encourage this sense
of community. It gives patients more control of a daunting care
environment. Telephones in the isolation area for patient use
can help care and morale. Recovering patients sometimes can
be tasked to help monitor the sickest of patients, prepare and
coach taking of ORS solution, potentially change IV bags, call
health staff, and translate. In other resource-constrained set-
tings, family members have alerted clinicians when IV fluid
bags are empty during the resuscitation of a patient.6 After
recovery, survivors and their families can be invaluable in
building community relationships outside treatment centers.
BEWARE OF THE CHALLENGES OF PATIENT
CARE ON THE SUSPECTWARD
Patients present for triage and screening for EVD when
they are sick. These patients might have EVD, another severe
illness, or both. Admitting a patient into isolation, particularly
one not yet confirmed with EVD, provokes a careful risk-
benefit analysis for this reason. The suspect ward admits
patients awaiting laboratory confirmation of their EVD, or
exclusion of EVD as the cause of their illness. Patients may
need to stay in the suspect ward for 3 or more days while
waiting for reliable diagnostic test results. The objective is to
provide sufficient benefit to both the patient and the commu-
nity to outweigh the risk to the patient if negative. The level
of care necessary here can be high. We have observed the
manifestations of severe malaria, gastrointestinal bleeding
in human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), viral hepatitis
co-infected patients with cirrhosis, pulmonary hemorrhage in
the setting of severe heart failure, epistaxis caused by malignant
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hypertension, complicated pregnancy, and non-Ebola viral
hemorrhagic fevers.
Use the same caution as in the high-risk area with con-
firmed EVD patients. However, some—if not many—of the
patients admitted to the suspect ward will not be EVD
infected and will be discharged rather than admitted to the
confirmed ward. Regardless of their EVD infection status,
they need a combination of individual patient and epidemiol-
ogy-directed empiric therapy. Careful practices for patient
toileting, patient placement, and triage for communicability
and clinician hygiene in between assessing individual suspect
patients are important to mitigate patient risk of acquiring
EVD infection if not yet infected.7
Assessment and management of infants and children pose
specific challenges in the field. Occasionally children with-
out symptoms have entered facilities with their ill caregiver,
such as the breastfeeding infant of an ill mother. These
infants and children, who cannot communicate symptoms
clearly yet sometimes move freely around the care center,
may need to be monitored with particular attention through-
out their time in the care center and for 21 days after
release. They will have care, nutrition, and EVD screening
needs in and out of isolation. Many of them will fall ill with
EVD. When infants and children have been ill with EVD,
sometimes a healthy adult has elected to enter to care for
them. Healthy adults require considerations similar to those
for healthy children.
DECREASE BARRIERS BETWEEN THE PATIENT
AND THE COMMUNITY WHEN APPROPRIATE
Isolating a patient introduces a high burden of care and
may create social barriers between the outbreak response
and patients, families, and their communities. Healthcare pro-
viders are wrapped in PPE, giving patients very limited ability
to make eye contact or read facial expressions. Patients, their
families and communities frequently witness deaths, followed
by decontamination of corpses and placement in body bags.
These experiences are traumatic and promote not only alien-
ation of the outbreak response from the community, but also
increase patients’ sense of isolation from caregivers and the
outside world.
Ensure that patients have ways to safely communicate with
healthcare workers, family, and friends. This can be done
using open line of sight areas with low barriers where ambu-
latory patients can speak with visitors across a safe distance.
In well-appointed hospitals, glass and electronic communica-
tion devices can be used. Seek mechanisms for patients to
charge their cellular phones to allow continued communica-
tion with family and friends. Provide positive feedback to
families and friends that come to the visitation area. When
resources allow and when appropriate and acceptable to the
patients, consider family entry into the high-risk area in PPE,
escorted for a supervised visit after prior training and indoc-
trination. Some patients, though, want time before interacting
with others. When discussing burial with families of deceased
patients, allow for their viewing of the body and participation
in a safe burial. This basic respect for patients and families
helps to build and maintain positive relationships with com-
munities, overcoming common misunderstandings and mak-
ing activities in the EVD care center more transparent.
BALANCE STAFF AND PATIENT NEEDS;
CARE FOR EACH OTHER
Physical and emotional fatigue may contribute to errors in
clinical decision making and IPC practice. Staff must protect
and monitor their health and the health of their colleagues. Be
wary of physical symptoms of dehydration, fatigue, and psy-
chological stresses caused by working in resource-constrained
and high-risk environments. This is true at the care site, after
hours and after the period providing care. For international
staff, the post-deployment period may present additional but
under-appreciated stressors. Returning to a higher resourced
health care setting leads to an inequity-tension experienced by
many people working both in low- and high-income countries.
Colleagues, neighbors, and others at home may have consider-
able apprehension about interactions with returning healthcare
workers, even though they may have little reason to suspect
EVD or other illness. Recently announced quarantine of
asymptomatic health care workers in some jurisdictions inevi-
tably adds to this post-deployment stress. We have used our
network of consultants not only as a technical sounding board
but also for personal support in and away from the field.
Following both general and specific principles, we can
provide effective and safe care regardless of geography. In
an outbreak, clinicians must focus on the part they play in
practicing the best EVD care possible. They also should
appreciate that direct patient care is both inextricably linked
with the overall outbreak response and only one part of
what is necessary to control an outbreak. An effective public
health response brings patients to care. Direct clinical care
builds trust, which facilitates other elements of the response.
Strong surveillance, contract tracing and monitoring, social
mobilization, and risk communication are essential. A well-
functioning EVD care center promotes the integration of all
of these aspects while respecting the broad range of work
being accomplished by others.
Clinicians and all staff participating in outbreak response
should strive to leave a legacy in improved systems for
local outbreak response. Ideally, these will enable effective
local responses, obviating the need for deployment rota-
tions for future outbreaks. Until then, more prepared, fully
equipped, and supported clinical teams are needed to con-
front EVD in West Africa. Clinical preparedness is needed
in at risk countries.
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